$500M Saved, $3.3B in Revenue Shed: How Post-Merger Restructuring Fixed the Unit Economics
Freed $1.4B in cash flow improvement in FY2022 by eliminating $500M in costs through restructuring.
DXC Technology, a Large Enterprise IT Services & Consulting company, created value through General and Administrative.
DXC Technology, formed from the 2017 merger of CSC and Hewlett Packard Enterprise Services, was an IT services company with approximately $17.7 billion in revenue (FY2021) and over 130,000 employees globally. The post-merger integration had left DXC with a bloated cost structure: duplicated corporate functions from two legacy companies, an oversized real estate footprint with hundreds of facilities worldwide, a contractor workforce that was expensive relative to full-time employees, and an inefficient network and telecommunications infrastructure inherited from the merger. SG&A and overhead costs were well above peer benchmarks as a percentage of revenue, and the company was losing share in a competitive market while simultaneously overspending on general operations. Operating margins were thin and free cash flow had been negative ($-648 million in FY2021), signaling a company burning cash on overhead rather than generating returns.
CEO Mike Salvino, who joined in September 2019, launched a cost reduction program targeting $500 million in savings across multiple G&A categories:
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $17.7B | ~$16.3B |
| Free cash flow | -$648M | +$743M (+$1.4B YoY) |
| Adj. EBIT margin | ~5.4% | ~7.7% (+230 bps) |
| Non-GAAP diluted EPS | — | +44% YoY |
| Cost savings delivered | — | $500M |
By FY2023, revenue had declined to $14.4B as underperforming contracts were exited alongside the cost programme.
DXC inherited from the CSC/HPE merger duplicated corporate functions, an oversized real estate footprint, an unusually high contractor mix, and redundant network infrastructure from two legacy organizations. The $500M in savings came primarily from eliminating redundancy rather than cutting capability — none of these costs would have survived long in a competitive market. The merger had simply deferred decisions that normal operating pressure would eventually have forced.
The free cash flow turnaround from -$648M to +$743M is the meaningful metric: the cost actions translated to economics, not just accounting. The revenue trade-off is real — $17.7B to $14.4B by FY2023 as underperforming contracts were exited alongside the cost programme — but this mirrors the logic of deliberate portfolio rationalization: lower revenue on a healthier cost structure is a better starting point than flat revenue on a bloated one. The constraint is that post-merger cost restructuring buys time and financial credibility; it does not generate growth.
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